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Abstract 
 
We experimentally investigate simultaneous decision-making in two contrasting 
environments: a competitive environment (a contest) and a cooperative environment (a voluntary 
contribution mechanism). We find that the cooperative nature of the voluntary contribution 
mechanism spills over to the contest, decreasing sub-optimal overbidding in the contest. 
However, contributions to the public good are not affected by simultaneous participation in the 
contest. There is a significant negative correlation between decisions made in competitive and 
cooperative environments, i.e. more cooperative subjects tend to be less competitive and vice 
versa. This correlation can be rationalized by heterogeneous social preferences towards 
inequality but not by bounded rationality theory. 
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1. Introduction 
Individuals, firms, and policy makers simultaneously interact in many different 
environments in practice. At the store checkout line an individual may choose how much to 
spend on lottery tickets (thus participating in a contest) and how much to donate to a charity 
(thus providing a public good). In the workplace, workers compete with each other for 
promotions while simultaneously working together on various tasks that are assigned to them. 
Farm owners may compete daily with each other in the market for their products and at the same 
time they may cooperate to build facilities that would be mutually beneficial to reduce waste 
management costs. 
The novel contribution of the current study is that we experimentally investigate 
individual behavior when competitive and cooperative environments are present simultaneously. 
To induce two contrasting environments, we employ a voluntary contribution mechanism 
(cooperative environment) and a lottery contest (competitive environment). In the voluntary 
contribution mechanism (VCM), individuals make contributions in order to provide a public 
good. In the contest, individuals make bids in order to win a prize. The fundamental difference 
between these two games is that bids in the contest exert a negative externality on others, while 
contributions in the VCM exert a positive externality. The findings from the literature when 
these games are played in isolation are clear and robust. In contests, individuals over-bid relative 
to socially optimal levels (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Sheremeta, 2010a,c).1 In 
VCMs, individuals contribute half-way between the equilibrium free riding and the Pareto 
                                                 
1 It is also documented that over-bidding decreases with experience (Davis and Reilly, 1998), groups make lower 
bids than individuals (Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010), and constraining individual endowments reduces over-bidding 
(Sheremeta, 2010a). 
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optimal level, with contributions declining over time (Ledyard, 1995; Fischbacher et al., 2001).2 
The contest is similar in practice to a wide variety of situations such as patent races, political 
contests, competitions for promotions in the workplace, or advertising campaigns. The VCM is 
similar to another broad class of situations, including the decision to volunteer for various groups 
or associations and voluntary monetary contributions to public goods or charities. The design of 
the experiment also permits us to analyze the correlation between each individual’s bid in the 
contest and his or her contribution in the VCM. 
The standard assumption in game theory is game independence, suggesting that the 
institutional context in which a decision is made does not matter. This assumption is questioned 
by recent experiments, which find that context matters greatly in some environments. Behavioral 
spillovers occur when games are played simultaneously, causing behaviors exhibited in one 
game to be carried over to the other game in a predictable way (Huck et al., 2007; Bednar et al., 
2009; Falk et al., 2009; Cason et al., 2009). Bednar et al. (2009) report a laboratory experiment 
with different two-player games and find that simultaneous game-play differs from isolated 
controls. Cason et al. (2009) report a laboratory experiment where the same group of five players 
participate in two different coordination games and find that cooperative behavior spills over 
from one game to the other.3 Huck et al. (2007) study two dissimilar two-player games played 
simultaneously and find that learning spillovers occur when feedback is not readily available for 
each game. On the contrary, Falk et al. (2009) investigate groups of different individuals playing 
two identical coordination games or two identical public goods games, and find that behavior 
                                                 
2Contributions increase when subjects are allowed to punish, assign disapproval points, send signals, or 
communicate with other subjects prior to contributions in the VCM (Ledyard, 1995; Fehr and Gachter, 2000).  
3 Cherry et al. (2003) and Cherry and Shogren (2007) also find that rationality exhibited in one setting affects 
behavior in a disparate setting introduced sequentially. Dickinson and Oxoby (2009) find that optimistic or 
pessimistic expectations developed in one setting can carry over to acceptance rates in an ultimatum game. 
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does not differ from the baseline where only one game at a time is played.4 The main difference 
of our study is that we investigate behavior in both competitive and cooperative environments, 
while previous studies consider coordination and public good games (Falk et al., 2009; Cason et 
al., 2009) or bi-matrix games such as the prisoner’s dilemma (Bednar et al., 2009). 
We find that overbidding in the contest is significantly reduced when individuals 
simultaneously participate in the VCM. This is a favorable outcome because overbidding in 
contests leads to sub-optimal results. However, we do not find significant differences in VCM 
contributions between the simultaneous-play and baseline treatments. We also find that there is a 
negative correlation between decisions made in the lottery contest and in the VCM, suggesting 
that individuals who are more competitive tend to be less cooperative and vice versa. As 
discussed in the conclusion, this research has broad implications for political and management 
institutional design, and for related research that attempts to solve problems of overbidding in 
contests and under-contribution in public goods. 
 
2. Experimental Design 
2.1. Theoretical Predictions 
The experimental design employs two games, a lottery contest and a VCM. The lottery 
contest is based on the theoretical model of Tullock (1980). In this contest, ܰ identical risk-
neutral players with initial endowment levels ݁ compete for a prize ܸ by submitting bids. The 
probability that a player ݅ wins the prize is equal to player ݅’s own bid ܾ௜ divided by the sum of 
all players’ bids. Given this, the expected payoff from the contest for player ݅ can be written as: 
                                                 
4 Other existing studies consider simultaneous interaction in several public goods environments, either breaking a 
single public good into multiple parts or presenting multiple public goods (Bernasconi et al., 2009; Biele et al., 
2008; Fellner and Lunser, 2008). 
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ߨ௜஼ ൌ ݁ െ ܾ௜ ൅ ܸܾ௜/ ∑ ௝ܾ௝ .        (1) 
Differentiating (1) with respect to ܾ௜ and accounting for the symmetric Nash equilibrium leads to 
the classic solution of ܾכ ൌ ܸሺܰ െ 1ሻ/ܰଶ, while the socially optimal level of bids is ܾௌை ൌ 0.  
The VCM is based on a linear public goods game where ܰ identical risk-neutral players 
choose a portion of their endowments ݁ to contribute to a public good (Groves and Ledyard, 
1977). Player ݅’s contribution ܿ௜ to the public good is multiplied by ݉ א ሺ0,1ሻ  and given to each 
of ܰ players in the group, where ݉ ൈ ܰ ൐ 1. Thus, the payoff from the VCM for player ݅ can be 
written as: 
ߨ௜௏஼ெ ൌ ݁ െ ܿ௜ ൅ ݉ ∑ ௝ܿ௝ .        (2) 
The Nash equilibrium in the VCM is to free ride by contributing nothing, ܿכ ൌ 0, while the 
socially optimal solution is to contribute one’s full endowment to the public good, ܿௌை ൌ ݁.  
In the VCM (2), over-contribution relative to the Nash equilibrium leads to outcomes that 
are closer to the socially optimal result. On the other hand, in the contest (1), overbidding is 
socially wasteful and the most socially desirable outcome is for everybody to bid nothing. Note 
that playing the games in ensemble does not change the standard Nash equilibrium prediction in 
either game.  
 
2.2. Experimental Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics 
Laboratory. Volunteers were recruited from a pool of undergraduate students from Purdue 
University. A total of 120 subjects participated in 6 sessions, with 20 subjects participating in 
each session. All subjects participated in only one session of this study. Some students had 
participated in other economics experiments that were unrelated to this research. 
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The computerized experimental sessions used z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) to record 
subject decisions and also (in the Contest-VCM treatment) to record the order of decisions. We 
conducted three treatments as summarized in Table 1: a baseline Contest treatment, a baseline 
VCM treatment, and a treatment in which these two games were played simultaneously.5 
Subjects were given the instructions, shown in the appendix, at the beginning of the session and 
the experimenter read the instructions aloud. In each session, 20 subjects were randomly 
assigned to groups of ܰ = 4 players and stayed in the same group throughout the entire 
experiment, playing each game for a total of 20 periods. 
Table 1: Summary of Treatments 
Treatment Game Played Number of Sessions 
Number of 
Subjects 
Number of Independent 
Observations 
Baseline Contest Contest 2 40 10 
Baseline VCM VCM 2 40 10 
Contest-VCM Contest & VCM 2 40 10 
 
At the beginning of each period, subjects received endowments of 80 francs in the contest 
(or VCM) and were asked to enter their bids (or contributions in the VCM). In the lottery 
contest, subjects competed with each other for the prize value of ܸ = 80 francs. In the VCM, 
each subject chose a portion of the 80 franc endowment to contribute to the public good, and 
kept the other portion for himself. Each player’s contribution to the public good was multiplied 
by ݉ = 0.4 and the total of all contributions given to each of the 4 players in the group. Subjects 
did not know others’ decisions before making their own decisions. After all subjects made their 
decisions, the sum of all bids (or contributions in the VCM) in each group was displayed on the 
                                                 
5 Note that treatments with two simultaneous contests or two simultaneous public goods are also possible as 
baselines. We believe that our Baseline Contest and Baseline VCM treatments are more appropriate for several 
reasons. First, this design allows us to see if behavior in ensemble games is different from behavior in isolated 
games. Second, there is no reason to believe that behavior in either the contest or the VCM would change if two of 
the same games were played in ensemble, as documented by Falk et al.’s (2009) for the case of two VCMs. 
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output screen together with the outcome, and earnings were determined. Subjects recorded their 
results in a record sheet, and then moved on to the next period. 
During the Contest-VCM treatment, the contest and VCM games were displayed side by 
side on the same screen.6 Subjects received a separate endowment in the contest and a separate 
endowment in the VCM at the beginning of each period. These endowments could not be 
transferred between games. Subjects typed their choices into each input box, and clicked 
“submit” at the bottom of the screen before moving on to the next period. To account for any 
order effect within each period, in one of the two Contest-VCM sessions, the contest game was 
displayed on the left (the VCM game was on the right), and in the other Contest-VCM session, 
the contest game was displayed on the right (the VCM game was on the left). During the 
decision-making stage in the Contest-VCM sessions, subjects were instructed to click on the 
input box for that game, and then enter their decision. A function was executed in z-Tree that 
kept track of which input box the subject clicked on first.7 
At the end of the experiment, two periods from the game were selected for payment using 
a random draw from a bingo cage. In the Contest-VCM treatment, two periods from each game 
(contest and VCM) were selected using the same method.  Experimental francs were used 
throughout the experiment, with a conversion rate of 25 francs = $1. Subjects earned $18 on 
average, and sessions (including instruction time) lasted approximately 75 minutes. Subjects also 
completed a demographic questionnaire at the end of each session. 
 
                                                 
6 We used categorical (and not ordinal) nomenclature to label each game, the colors blue and green (instead of, for 
example, 1 and 2 or A and B).  
7 When the contest game was displayed on the left, subjects made a decision in the contest game first 92% of the 
time. When the VCM was displayed on the left, subjects made a decision in the VCM game first 93% of the time. 
This is unsurprising, given that over 95% of subjects in the experiment self-reported that they read and write from 
left to right horizontally in their native language, and that all instructions were in English, which reads from left to 
right. We do not find any difference between individual behavior in the two Contest-VCM sessions; therefore, we 
pool the sessions. 
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3. Results & Discussion 
3.1 Overview 
Table 2 reports the average contribution in the VCM and the average bid in the contest 
across all treatments. According to the theory, the unique equilibrium bid in the contest is ܾכ = 
15. In contrast to the theoretical prediction, we find significant over-bidding of about 120% in 
the baseline contest treatment. This finding is consistent with previous experimental findings, 
which document that subjects overbid by up to 200% relative to the theoretical predictions 
(Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Sheremeta, 2010b,c). As the result of over-bidding, 
subjects earn significantly lower payoffs than is predicted by the theory.8 
Table 2: Average Statistics 
Treatment Equilibrium Contest-VCM 
Baseline 
VCM 
Baseline 
Contest 
Value of the Prize in Contest, V 80 80  80 
MPCR in VCM, a 0.4 0.4 0.4  
Number of Players, N 4 4 4 4 
Bid in Contest 15 26.8 (0.8)  33.5 (0.8) 
Payoff in Contest 105 73.2 (1.2)  66.5 (1.2) 
Contribution in VCM 0 22.4 (0.9) 23.9 (1.0)  
Payoff in VCM 80 93.4 (0.7) 94.3 (0.8)  
Standard error of the mean in parentheses. 
 
The unique equilibrium prediction for contributions in the VCM is ܿכ = 0. However, any 
over-contribution relative to the equilibrium leads to more desirable outcomes; specifically, 
contribution of the full endowment results in the most socially optimal outcome. Relative to 
theoretical predictions, we find significant over-contribution in the VCM in all treatments. This 
finding is consistent with previous experimental studies, which report that over-contribution is 
common in public goods environments due to altruism or social norms (Ledyard, 1995). Fehr 
                                                 
8 To determine the net payoff from the contest, subtract the endowment of 80 from payoffs in Table 3.1. 
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and Gachter (2000) report contribution levels at 40-60% of the endowment during the 
experiment, with contributions falling to 27% in the final period. Note that as the result of over-
contribution, subjects’ payoffs in the VCM are significantly higher than the equilibrium 
prediction. 
Result 1. Relative to theoretical predictions, there is significant over-bidding in the 
contest and significant over-contribution in the VCM in all treatments. 
Figure 1: Distribution of Bid/Contribution 
 
Figure 1 displays the distribution of contributions in the VCM and bids in the contest 
over all periods by treatment. Individual bids in the contest are distributed on the entire strategy 
space, contrary to the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of 15. Individual contributions in 
the VCM are also distributed on the entire strategy space, contrary to the unique pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium of 0. A high variance in individual bids is consistent with previous 
experimental findings in the contest (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Sheremeta, 
2010a,b). The distribution of contributions in the VCM is also consistent with previous 
experimental findings (Ledyard, 1995; Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001). 
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3.2 Comparison of Simultaneous with Baselines 
Figure 2 displays the average contribution and the average bid over all 20 periods of the 
experiment for the baseline and Contest-VCM treatments. In order to study the effect of 
displaying two games simultaneously, we examine decisions in the first five periods and 
decisions in the last five periods.9 In the baseline VCM treatment, the average contribution in the 
VCM starts at 36.7 in the first five periods and decreases to 12.6 in the last five periods. 
Similarly, in the Contest-VCM treatment, the average contribution starts at 35.6 in the first five 
periods and decreases to 11.5 in the last five periods. A regression of the contribution on a period 
trend shows a significant and negative relationship for both treatments (p-value < 0.01). The 
difference between contributions in the baseline VCM and Contest-VCM treatments is not 
statistically significant based on a Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p-value = 0.54).10 
Result 2: Simultaneously participating in the contest does not have a significant effect on 
contributions in the VCM. 
Related literature reports that when playing two simultaneous public goods games with 
different groups, individuals are influenced in each game by the contributions of their own group 
members, and not by the contributions of the other group members (Falk et al., 2009). We find 
that even when playing with the same subjects, bids in the contest do not influence contributions 
to the public good. This is consistent with Falk et al.’s (2009) observation that the abstraction to 
                                                 
9 Note that while comparison of decisions made in period 1 may be more appropriate for understanding decision 
making without the influence of the concurrently displayed game, we average decisions across the first five periods 
because subjects are still learning in the first few periods. We compare decision-making at the beginning of the 
session (first five periods) to decision-making at the end of the session (last five periods).  
10 The non-parametric tests use the average contribution (bid) in each group across all the periods for each 
observation, and groups in this fixed matching design are statistically independent. 
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study public goods behavior in laboratory games, where individuals are only participating in one 
game, may be a good approximation for behavior in practice.11 
Figure 2: Average Bid/Contribution by Treatments 
  
In the baseline Contest treatment, the average bid starts at 36.5 in the first five periods 
and decreases to 33.7 in the last five periods. In the Contest-VCM treatment, the average bid in 
the contest starts at 31.5 in the first five periods and decreases to 24.4 in the last five periods. A 
regression of the bid on a period trend shows a significant and negative relationship for the 
Contest-VCM treatment (p-value < 0.01) but not for the baseline Contest treatment (p-value = 
0.21).12 Overall, the declining bid trend is consistent with previous research, documenting that 
over-bidding decreases over time (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Sheremeta, 2010a,c). 
                                                 
11 Note that in the Falk et al. (2009) and in our study, endowments are not shared between the two games; rather, 
subjects receive a set endowment for each game. This result may be most applicable in this setting, but whether this 
result holds when endowments are shared across simultaneous games could be considered in future work. 
12 However, when controlling for the lagged bids, we find a significant period trend in both treatments (see Table 
3.2). 
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The difference between bids in the baseline Contest and Contest-VCM treatments is 
statistically significant based on a Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p-value = 0.06, 2-tailed test).13 
Figure 3 displays, by group, the average over-dissipation rates, defined as the ratio of the total 
sum of bids to the value of the prize. On average, groups in the baseline Contest treatment have 
greater over-dissipation rates than groups in the Contest-VCM treatment. This difference in 
behavior can be explained by the developing literature on simultaneous decision-making, which 
suggests that behavior spills over from one game to another in predictable ways (Cason et al., 
2009; Bednar et al., 2009).14 We provide a more detailed discussion in Section 4.3. 
Result 4: Simultaneously participating in the VCM significantly reduces overbidding in 
the contest. 
Figure 3: Over-dissipation Rates by Groups 
 
 
                                                 
13 This difference is especially significant when looking at the last 10 periods of the experiment (p-value < 0.01). 
14 Cason et al. (2009), for example, find that participating in a more cooperative environment can work to increase 
cooperation in a less cooperative environment. Likewise, we find that participating in the cooperative VCM 
environment helps to reduce competitive over-bidding in the contest. 
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Table 3: Regression Models of Individual Subject Choices 
Dependent Variable: Contest Bid VCM Contribution 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Contest-
VCM 
Individual Subject Choices in Baseline 
Contest 
Contest-
VCM 
Baseline 
VCM 
Contest Bid    -0.31 
    (0.19) 
VCM Contribution  -0.13*   
  (0.06)   
Lag of Group Contest Bid 0.02 0.08**   
 (0.02) (0.02)   
Lag of Group VCM Contribution   0.14** 0.19** 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Inverse of Period 17.35** 29.8** 39.52** 30.8** 
 (5.87) (2.5) (7.12) (10.00) 
Observations 760 760 760 760 
Number of subjects 40 40 40 40 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Columns (2) and (4) are estimated using a simultaneous system of equations 
 
We find that bid choices in the contest are influenced by contribution choices in the 
VCM, but that contribution choices in the VCM are not affected by bid choices in the contest. 
Table 3 reports regression results that also support these findings. We estimate regressions 
separately for the contest and the VCM, using the subjects’ choices as the dependent variable. A 
period trend, the bid (contribution), and lagged total group bid (contribution) are the independent 
variables. The previous period group choices in each game positively influence the current 
choice in all treatments (however, this effect is not significant in specification 1). This suggests 
that, in line with previous VCM and contest studies, subjects’ decisions in the current period are 
influenced by their group members’ decisions in the previous period (Croson et al., 2005; 
Sheremeta, 2010a). In the Contest-VCM treatment, we also find that the individual’s 
contribution in the current period negatively affects the individual bid in the current period 
(column 2), while the individual’s bid in the current period does not affect the individual’s 
14 
 
contribution in the current period (column 4). The estimation of equations in columns (2) and (4) 
used a simultaneous equation system since subjects made both game decisions at the same 
time.15 These findings support Results 3 and 4 - that simultaneous participation in the contest 
does not have a significant effect on VCM contributions, but that simultaneous participation in 
the VCM has a significant effect on contest bids. 
 
3.3 Behavioral Effects 
As in previous work (Bednar et al., 2009; Cason et al., 2009), we use the concepts of 
cognitive load and behavioral spillover to explain the change in behavior when games are played 
simultaneously. Both effects can be applied as possible explanations for Results 3 and 4.  The 
cognitive load effect suggests that due to limited cognitive abilities, the subject’s behavior in a 
more complex game may be affected by decision-making strategies from the easier game. The 
behavioral spillover effect suggests that behavior can “spill over” from one game to another 
when the two games are played simultaneously.  
Cognitive load is a construct in psychology representing the burden that performing a 
task imposes on the learner’s cognitive system (Simon, 1982; Paas and van Merrienboer, 1994). 
Playing ensembles of games increases cognitive load, which causes subjects to apply common 
analogies to disparate bargaining situations, and this has been modeled formally by Samuelson 
(2001). When a problem is complex and requires high cognitive load, individuals may use 
heuristics or “rules of thumb” to make decisions (Wright, 1980; Gigerenzer et al., 1996). In the 
present context, cognitive limitations may cause subjects to apply similar strategies to the contest 
                                                 
15 We used session dummy-variables to control for session effects. The estimation results are very similar when 
using individual subject dummy-variables to control for individual subject effects. The only exception is that in 
specification (2) the VCM Contribution variable is no longer significant. The main reason is that in the estimation of 
simultaneous equation system with subject dummy-variables we need to use too many degrees of freedom.  
15 
 
and VCM in order to reduce cognitive burdens. Specifically, strategies from lower cognitive load 
games could be applied to games with higher cognitive load. Psychologists propose various 
methods for measuring cognitive load; for an overview, see Paas et al. (2003). A relevant 
measure for assessment of cognitive load is the complexity of the game. We posit that cognitive 
load is greater in the contest than in the VCM. First, the contest involves greater uncertainty than 
the VCM. In the VCM, each subject forms beliefs about other’s contributions and determines her 
probable outcome. In the contest, on the other hand, each subject must first form beliefs about 
other’s bids and then form a belief about the probability that her bid will win, where this 
probability also depends on other group members’ bids.16 Second, the decision-making process 
in the contest is much more involved than in the VCM, and while the equilibrium of the VCM is 
in dominant strategies, the equilibrium for the contest is not.  Moreover, the payoff function is 
flatter (and concave) in the contest than in the VCM. For the above reasons, the cognitive load 
effect should cause the subject to use strategies from the VCM to motivate her behavior in the 
contest, thus lowering contest bids. 
The direction of behavioral spillover can be predicted by the level of strategic 
uncertainty and social interaction effects in the two games. Cason et al. (2009) posit that games 
with lower strategic uncertainty have a stronger behavioral spillover effect onto other games, 
and use a measurement of volatility to describe the degree of strategic uncertainty. Similarly, we 
propose that the behavioral spillover effect causes behavior in games with a lower volatility of 
individual decisions across different periods to “spill over” onto games with a higher volatility of 
decisions. We measure the degree of volatility in individual decision-making by computing the 
absolute difference between the decisions made in period t and period t-1. We find that in the 
Contest-VCM treatment, the average volatility of bids in the contest is higher than the average 
                                                 
16 Understanding probability can be difficult for subjects due to bounded rationality (Camerer, 2003). 
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volatility of contributions in the VCM (14.8 versus 12.2).17 This result suggests that the VCM 
game should have a stronger behavioral spillover effect onto the contest. 
Falk et al. (2009) find that behavior in public goods games is in large part influenced by 
the social interaction effect, which suggests that individuals change their behavior in response to 
changes in their respective group members’ behavior. Another possible explanation for the 
direction of the behavioral spillover is that there is a greater social interaction effect in the VCM 
as compared to the contest, which implies that behavior in the contest should not influence 
behavior in the VCM, while behavior in the VCM should influence behavior in the contest. To 
measure the social interaction effect, we separately estimated regressions for each individual in 
the baseline treatments. The dependent variable is the total of other group’s contributions (bids) 
in the previous period and the independent variable is the subject’s contribution (bid) in the 
current period. The coefficient on lagged group choices is statistically significant for 4 out of 40 
subjects in the contest and 10 out of 40 subjects in the public good. Moreover, in all of the 
regressions which were statistically significant in the VCM, the effect moves in a predictable 
direction – all coefficients on previous group choices are negative, even after accounting for the 
linear period trend. On the other hand, there is no such pattern in the contest. Another way to 
measure the social interaction effect is to compare the volatility of choices across individuals 
within each group over time. In the contest, the average standard deviation of bids across all 
groups is 15.1 in periods 1-5 and 14.3 in periods 15-20. In the VCM, the average standard 
deviation of contributions is 14.5 in periods 1-5 and it falls to 8.1 in periods 15-20. The 
substantial decrease in volatility of individual contributions in the VCM implies that the VCM 
                                                 
17 When using the data from the baseline treatments, the average volatility in contests is 14.8 and in VCMs it is 13.4. 
Using the average volatility in bids and contributions within each group across all the periods as one independent 
observation, the sign test of matched pairs can reject the equality of volatilities at 0.1 significance level.  
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has a stronger social interaction effect.18 The stronger social interaction effect in the VCM 
suggests that behavior in the VCM is less likely to have a significant spillover effect onto 
behavior in the contest.19 
Finally, behavioral spillover can occur due to the presence of ‘conditional cooperators’ in 
the VCM game, i.e. subjects who contribute more to a public good the more others contribute 
(Fischbacher et al., 2001). The presence of conditional cooperators has been documented in the 
lab and in the field (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Keser and Winden, 2002; Harrison and List, 2004; 
Fischbacher and Gächter, 2006; Kocher et al., 2007; Herrmann and Thoni, 2009).  The behavior 
of conditional cooperators is based on their perception of the “type” of individuals with whom 
they are interacting: for example, knowing that others are the “free-rider” type, conditional 
cooperators also free ride. In fact, any factor that influences beliefs about the nature of others’ 
cooperation may influence the behavior of conditional cooperators (Gächter, 2006). If several 
games are present concurrently, the “type” of individual one is grouped with may be inferred 
from group members’ behavior in any of the games present. In our experiment, conditional 
cooperators can form beliefs about types in their group in one game (contest or VCM), and apply 
these beliefs to a disparate game (VCM or contest).  By reducing contest bids, subjects may 
signal their cooperative type to conditional cooperators in order to induce higher contribution to 
the VCM.  
To summarize, we find that participation in the public goods environment influences 
individuals to bid less in the contest, which may occur due to several possible effects. Cognitive 
                                                 
18 Note that the biggest difference between bids in the baseline Contest and Contest-VCM treatment is in the last 
five periods of the experiment (Figure 3.2). Volatility in VCM is the lowest in the last five periods as well. 
19 One could also argue that the VCM evokes a social norm of cooperation that reduces competitiveness in the 
contest (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996). However, such argument would imply that, as contributions to the 
VCM decline (thus reducing social norms), bids in contests should increase. Figure 3.2 shows that this is clearly not 
the case, since both the contributions and bids decline over time in the Contest-VCM treatment. 
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load may cause subjects to apply the strategy from the public goods game to the contest, 
decreasing bids. Discovering the direction of behavioral spillover is more complex. The strategic 
uncertainty effect may act to cause behavior in the VCM to spill over onto behavior in the 
contest. In addition, the presence of conditional cooperators may act to cause behavior in the 
VCM to spill over onto behavior in the contest.  
 
3.4 Correlation of Bids and Contributions 
Another contribution of our study is that we can directly compare bids in the contest with 
contributions in the VCM. This is possible because of the within-subjects design of the Contest-
VCM treatment. Figure 4 displays individual contributions and bids for the Contest-VCM 
treatment, averaged over periods 1-5 and periods 16-20. A Spearman’s rank correlation test 
shows that individuals who contribute more to the VCM also bid less in contests in the first five 
periods of the game (correlation -0.27, p-value < 0.10).20 
Result 5. Subjects who bid more in the contest also tend to contribute less in the VCM. 
To explain the negative correlation between bids and contributions, we consider two 
competing theories that are often employed to explain individual behavior in the public goods 
and contest experiments. The two common explanations for non-zero contributions to public 
goods are based on social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Sobel, 2005) and bounded 
rationality or mistakes (Andreoni, 1995; Anderson et al., 1998; Houser and Kurzban, 2002). The 
same arguments are also applied to explain over-bidding in contests (Herrmann and Orzen, 2008; 
Sheremeta, 2010a). The design of our novel Contest-VCM treatment enables us to distinguish 
                                                 
20 We also used only the period 1 contributions and bids to look at correlation and found only slight insignificant 
correlation. It is likely that subjects are still learning in the first period and thus their decisions are noisy.  
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between these two competing theories, as they generate opposing predictions for the correlation 
of bids and contributions.   
Figure 4: Correlation of Bids and Contributions (Periods 1-5 and 16-20 averaged)
 
Social preferences are often cited as the reason why behavior is not in line with theory in 
many settings. A variety of social preference models may account for the negative correlation of 
bids and contributions, and our goal is not to distinguish among them. Rather, our objective is to 
present a simple model that can inform our findings, and we use the inequality aversion model 
because it is one which has been formally presented in both the VCM and contest literature as a 
possible justification for observed behavior (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Hermann and Orzen, 
2008). In the public goods literature, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show how inequality aversion 
may explain individual behavior in the VCM. In the contest literature, Grund and Sliwka (2005) 
and Herrmann and Orzen (2008) demonstrate that inequality aversion may account for over-
bidding. It is straightforward to show that inequality aversion can explain the negative 
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correlation between bids and contributions.21 As in Fehr and Schmidt (1999), assume that 
subject ݅ suffers from inequality and his utility is given by: 
௜ܷሺߨ௜, ߨି௜ሻ ൌ ߨ௜ െ ߙ௜ ଵேିଵ max௜ஷ௝ ൛ߨ௝ െ ߨ௜, 0ൟ െ ߚ௜
ଵ
ேିଵ max௜ஷ௝ ൛ߨ௜ െ ߨ௝, 0ൟ.   (3) 
This utility function assumes that subject ݅ dislikes disadvantageous inequality, i.e. if 
subject ݅ earns one less franc than subject ݆, his utility is reduced by ߙ௜ ൐ 0 francs. Further, 
subject ݅ also dislikes advantageous inequality to some extent, ߚ௜ ൒ 0, but not as much as 
disadvantageous inequality, i.e. ߙ௜ ൐ ߚ௜. The utility function (3) implies that subjects who have 
higher disadvantageous inequality ߙ should make lower contributions in the VCM in order to 
avoid the circumstance where they are the highest contributors with the lowest payoffs. The 
same subjects should bid more in the lottery contest in order to avoid a circumstance where they 
do not win a prize and thus receive the lowest payoff (Herrmann and Orzen, 2008). The key 
reason why social preferences work in the opposite direction in the VCM and the contest is that 
in the VCM, individual contributions exert a positive externality on others, while in the contest 
individual bids exert a negative externality on others. 
Another common argument for over-contribution in the VCM and over-bidding in 
contests is bounded rationality. Individuals often make mistakes when contributing to public 
goods or bidding in contests. Anderson et al. (1998) directly test this hypothesis by applying a 
quantal response equilibrium (QRE) model, which accounts for errors made by individual 
                                                 
21 Several other social preference models exist which can, individually or in ensemble, explain our findings. Similar 
to the inequality aversion model, one can make an argument that kindness or “warm glow” can explain the negative 
correlation between contributions in the VCM and bids in contests. Andreoni (1995) hypothesized that one of the 
reasons why people contribute to public goods is kindness. Although no formal arguments have been made of what 
is the effect of kindness on individual behavior in contests, it is intuitive that more kind individuals should bid less 
in order to allow others to win the contest. Therefore, the presence of kindness would imply negative correlation 
between bids and contributions. Spiteful preferences are also a possible explanation for the correlation, and several 
studies have noted that spite plays a major role in sanctioning in public goods experiments (Falk et al., 2005). Under 
this model, subjects prefer to earn more than others, and therefore may over-bid in the contest but contribute less in 
the VCM. 
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subjects, to the VCM. They find that depending on the magnitude of the decision error, mean 
contributions to the public good lie between the Nash prediction and half the endowment, and 
higher decision errors correspond to higher contributions. In our experiment, this implies that 
contributions in the VCM should be between ܿכ ൌ 0 and ܿ ൌ 40. Sheremeta (2010a) shows how 
the QRE can explain some over-dissipation in lottery contests. The prediction of the QRE is that 
when the endowment is equal to the prize value (as it is in our experiment) then mean bids in the 
contest lie between the Nash prediction and half the endowment, and higher decision errors 
correspond to higher bids. In our experiment, this implies that bids in the contest should be 
between ܾכ ൌ 15 and ܾ ൌ 40. Moreover, bounded rationality implies that subjects who make 
more mistakes both contribute and bid more, which should result in a positive, rather than 
negative, correlation between bids and contributions. 
Note that the negative correlation between individual contributions and bids disappears 
over time. When analyzing the last five periods of the experiment, we do not find a significant 
correlation (correlation 0.13, p-value = 0.43). This result is not surprising, given the fact that by 
the end of the experiment, subjects’ decisions have already been heavily influenced by the 
decisions of others and therefore social preferences play a less significant role in the later 
periods.22 
 
4. Conclusion 
We investigated simultaneous decision-making in two contrasting environments: a 
competitive environment (lottery contest) and a cooperative environment (voluntary contribution 
                                                 
22 We have re-estimated Table 3.2 separately for periods 1-5 and 16-20. The estimation results confirm that 
individual choices are significantly influenced by group choices in first five periods (p-values are less than 0.01 for 
the contest and VCM). On the other hand, group choices do not affect significantly individual choices in the last 
period (p-values are 0.71 and 0.23 for the contest and VCM). 
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mechanism). We found that the cooperative nature of the voluntary contribution mechanism 
favorably influenced the contest in the simultaneous decision-making treatment by decreasing 
over-dissipation in the contest. This result can be explained by behavioral spillover and social 
interaction effects. We also found that there is a significant negative correlation between 
decisions made in the lottery contest and in the VCM, which can be justified by heterogeneous 
social preferences towards inequality but not by bounded rationality theory. 
Our findings have several practical implications. It is well documented that over-
dissipation in contests occurs in the advertising industry as firms compete with each other in ad 
campaigns (Cason and Datta, 2006) and in political contests, where candidates spend more than 
the efficient amount on campaigning (Sheremeta, 2010b). A number of studies have tried to find 
ways to reduce over-dissipation, such as repetition (Davis and Reilly, 1998), constraining 
endowments (Parco et al., 2005; Sheremeta, 2010a), and group decision-making (Sheremeta and 
Zhang, 2010). Our study points out that another way to reduce over-dissipation in a contest is to 
allow subjects to participate simultaneously in a public goods game. In practice, this suggests 
that individuals participating in giving to charities or volunteering at community organizations 
should over-dissipate less in contests. Therefore, this may explain why the observed levels of 
over-dissipation in the lab are higher than in the field (Hazlett and Michaels, 1993; Sheremeta 
and Zhang, 2010). 
Another implication of our findings is for designing optimal organizational structure of 
firms. It is well known that rent-seeking occurs in firms because workers, management and 
owners have incentives to invest resources in disputes over the firm’s profits, which reduces firm 
efficiency (Congleton, 2008). Firms with an organizational structure that reduces these socially 
wasteful activities will be relatively more efficient. For example, related work has suggested that 
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certain changes to ownership structure (Muller and Warneryd, 2001; Congleton, 1989) will 
reduce rent-seeking. Our findings provide guidance for reducing inefficient rent-seeking 
activities within firms through the incorporation of more cooperative activities among workers. 
In particular, an organization that encourages cooperative activities within groups or promotions 
based on group effort may see a reduction in rent-seeking. This partly explains why greater 
emphasis has been placed on team work in organizations in past years, and why team work can 
lead to greater organizational success (Cohen, 1997). 
Although game independence is a standard assumption in game theory, our findings 
provide clear evidence that the institutional context in which a decision is made matters for the 
games under study. Given that many activities in practice involve simultaneous decision-making 
in environments similar to contests and public goods, it is important to study these competitive 
and cooperative environments in ensemble. Future research should study behavioral spillovers 
when the contest and public goods game are played sequentially, and compare this to 
simultaneous behavioral spillovers. Considering other alternative environments for competition 
(such as first and second price auctions, oligopolistic competition, and rank-order tournaments) 
and cooperation (such as trust games, weakest-link public goods, and common pool resources) is 
also of great interest. Finally, it is important to investigate how behavioral spillovers can be used 
to design more efficient economic systems. We leave these extensions for future research. 
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Appendix – Instructions (Contest-VCM Treatment) 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: In this experiment you will participate in a game with three other participants. You will not 
know the identity of the participants you are grouped with. The experiment will consist of 20 periods. You will 
participate in both a BLUE GAME and a GREEN GAME at the same time and with the same participants. The 
BLUE GAME will appear on the left side of the screen and the GREEN GAME will appear on the right side of the 
screen at the same time in all 20 periods.  
At the end of the experiment 2 out of 20 periods will be randomly selected for payment for the BLUE 
GAME and 2 out of 20 periods will be randomly selected for payment for the GREEN GAME. After you have 
completed all periods two tokens will be randomly drawn out of a bingo cage containing tokens numbered from 1 to 
20. The token numbers determine which two periods are going to be paid in the BLUE GAME. These tokens will be 
returned to the bingo cage, and two tokens will be randomly drawn again out of a bingo cage containing tokens 
numbered from 1 to 20. The token numbers determine which two periods are going to be paid in the GREEN 
GAME. 
Each period you will be given 80 francs for the BLUE GAME and 80 francs for the GREEN GAME. 
Francs will be converted to U.S. dollars at the end of the experiment at the rate of 25 francs = $1. Each period, you 
will select a bid for the BLUE GAME and an allocation for the GREEN GAME. When you are ready to make your 
decision, click on the “input boxes” below “How much would you like to bid?” and “How much would you like to 
allocate to the Group Account?” and the program will allow you to enter in your number choices. When you are 
finished making your choices, click “Submit”. 
 
 
 
BLUE GAME: Each period, you and all other participants will be given an initial endowment of 80 francs and you 
will be asked to decide how much you want to bid for a reward. The reward is worth 80 francs to you and the other 
three participants in your group. You may bid any integer number of francs between 0 and 80. After all participants 
have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated. These earnings will be converted to cash and 
paid at the end of the experiment if the current period is the period that is randomly chosen for payment. If you 
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receive the reward your period earnings are equal to your endowment plus the reward minus your bid. If you do not 
receive the reward your period earnings are equal to your endowment minus your bid. 
 
If you receive the reward:     Earnings = Endowment + Reward – Your Bid = 80 + 80 – Your Bid  
If you do not receive the reward:   Earnings = Endowment – Your Bid = 80 – Your Bid 
 
The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive the reward. The more the other participants in your group bid, 
the less likely you are to receive the reward. Specifically, for each franc you bid you will receive one lottery ticket. 
At the end of each period the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by 4 
participants in the group, including you. The owner of the drawn ticket receives the reward of 80 francs. Thus, your 
chance of receiving the reward is given by the number of francs you bid divided by the total number of francs all 4 
participants in your group bid. You can never guarantee yourself the reward. However, by increasing your bid, you 
can increase your chance of receiving the reward. Regardless of who receives the reward, all participants will have 
to pay their bids. 
 
Chance of receiving the 
reward = 
Your Bid 
Sum of all 4 Bids in your group 
 
In case all participants bid zero, the reward is randomly assigned to one of the four participants in the group.  
 
Example: This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer is making a random draw. Let’s say 
participant 1 bids 10 francs, participant 2 bids 15 francs, participant 3 bids 0 francs, and participant 4 bids 40 francs. 
Therefore, the computer assigns 10 lottery tickets to participant 1, 15 lottery tickets to participant 2, 0 lottery tickets 
to participant 3, and 40 lottery tickets for participant 4. Then the computer randomly draws one lottery ticket out of 
65 (10 + 15 + 0 + 40). As you can see, participant 4 has the highest chance of receiving the reward: 0.62 = 40/65. 
Participant 2 has 0.23 = 15/65 chance, participant 1 has 0.15 = 10/65 chance, and participant 3 has 0 = 0/65 chance 
of receiving the reward. 
After all participants make their bids, the computer will make a random draw which will decide who 
receives the reward. Then the computer will calculate your period earnings based on your bid and whether you 
received the reward or not.  
 
GREEN GAME:  Each period you will be given 80 francs and you will be asked to decide how much of this 
amount you want to allocate to a Group Account. The remainder will be automatically allocated to your Individual 
Account. You may allocate any integer number of francs between 0 and 80. After all participants have made their 
decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated. These earnings will be converted to cash and paid at the end 
of the experiment if the current period is the period that is randomly chosen for payment. Your earnings consist of 
two parts 
 
1) Your earnings from the Individual Account  
2) Your earnings from the Group Account  
 
Your earnings from the Individual Account equal to the francs that you keep for yourself and do not depend on the 
decisions of others. Therefore, for every franc you keep for yourself in your Individual Account, you earn 1 franc. 
 
Your earnings from the Group Account depend on the total number of francs allocated to the Group Account by all 
4 group members (including you). In particular, your earnings from the Group Account are 40 percent of the total 
allocation of all 4 group members (including you) to the Group Account. Therefore, for every franc you allocate to 
the Group Account, you increase the total allocation to the Group Account by 1 franc. Therefore, your earnings from 
the Group Account rise by 0.4×1=0.4 francs. And the earnings of the other group members also rise by 0.4 francs 
each, so that the total earnings of the group from the Group Account rise by 1.6 francs. 
In summary, your period earnings are determined as follows: 
 
Your earnings = earnings from the Individual Account + earnings from the Group Account =  
 =80 - (your allocation to the Group Account) + 0.4×(allocation of 4 group members to the Group Account) 
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Example: Suppose that you allocated 40 francs to the Group Account and that the other three members of your 
group allocated a total of 120 francs. This makes a total of 160 francs in the Group Account. In this case each 
member of the group receives earnings from the Group Account of 0.4×160 = 64 francs. In addition, you also 
receive 40 francs from your Individual Account since you have kept 40 francs to your Individual Account. 
OUTCOME SCREEN 
BLUE GAME: At the end of each period, your bid, the sum of all bids in your group, whether you received the 
reward or not, and the earnings for the period are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Once the 
outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the 
appropriate heading. 
GREEN GAME: At the end of each period, your allocation and the sum of all allocations in your group are 
reported on the outcome screen as shown below. To aid you in your calculation, you are also shown your income 
from your individual account and your income from the group account. Once the outcome screen is displayed you 
should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate heading. 
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